The essay explores the philosophical (metatheoretical) presuppositions of democratic social strategy in the current "apocalyptic age". Here democracy means a way of life based on the assumption that individual freedom, mutual respect and fundamental good will toward the other can be taken for granted; as a feasible and a desirable way of ordering human affairs. In this broadly cultural sense, democracy is an outgrowth of a deeply rooted consensus on the posture of respect and good will toward all. Yet democracy, with its Enlightenment heritage of sober rationality, seems ill-equipped for dealing with apocalyptic threats. That what makes our age apocalyptic is truth denied. The arrogant posture of omnipotence leads to paralysis. A democratic strategy needs to be one that has the courage to face the truth and the commitment to deal heart and will with the finite tasks we recognise once we give up the arrogance of infinite ones.
In spite of its whimsical title, the intent and content of this essay are wholly earnest. It is to enquire into the possibilities-if any-of a democratic social strategy in the face of a pervasive sense of impending doom.
1 Modern democracy, the audacious attempt to subordinate the experts to the amateurs, 2 the elites to the people, was born amid the historic 1 The explicit prophecies of doom are familiar enough-Friedrich Nietzsche's dramatic announcement of the death of God in Thus Spake Zarathustra, Marx's apocalyptic reading of the social question in Das Kapital, Karl Jaspers's assessment of the nuclear threat in Die Atombombe und die Zukunft der Menschtum or Milan Machovec's confrontation with environmental degradation in Filosofie tváří tvář zániku (Philosophy Confronting Demise, in Czech only) or James Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia and a host of others. My concern is rather with the sense of doom which pervades our society and surfaces in such things as the fascination of catastrophic films, preoccupation with insurance and safety down to the paranoid "safety regulations" on airlines of which the writers cited appear another symptom rather than a cause of the apocalyptic age. Professional politicians are experts at knowing the public weal; voters are those who live and love it. HUMAN AFFAIRS 20, 95-107, 2010 DOI: 10.2478 optimism of the Enlightenment and suited it. Can it function in an apocalyptic age enframed 3 by a loss of all such confidence? That is, admittedly, a question about philosophical presuppositions rather than about the empirics of the experience they seek to enframe, and as such a metatheoretical rather than a theoretical one. Metatheories, as we shall use the term, are concerned with the meaning-structures of experienced realities rather than with the fortuitous "facts" thereof. 4 A metatheory, basically a coherent set of postulates, is compatible with any set of "facts", at least in principle, given enough epicycles and infinite computer capacity. "Facts" for their part are quite promiscuous about the metatheories they will let enframe them into a coherent whole. They-and the empirical research dealing with them-always presuppose a conceptual framework to render them intelligible. Thus in dealing with metatheoretical problems we are led from questions of empirical research to the time-honoured philosophic task of conceptually clarifying the ways we enframe our experience rather than empirically describing it. Our task is to observe clearly and articulate faithfully the presupposed meaning structures of the acts, events and processes of lived experience.
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For that task, the most promising strategy may well be a refractive one, examining the experiencing in the mirror of the experienced. We have before us the idea of democracy. What assumptions do we need to make-or perhaps are we making, without ever being aware of it-that make democracy appear to be a reasonable manner of ordering human affairs?
We are not, to be sure, speaking of "democracy" as the term is used in imperial practice, of soldiers coming with ballot boxes to line up bewildered beneficiaries of their efforts to cast ballots legitimising imperial rule. It of course need not be as bald-faced as we have latterly witnessed in Iraq or Afghanistan. Even reduced to the mechanics of voting, democracy might provide at least a less violent alternative of assuring the rule of the more over the fewer than a civil war. It might even include mechanisms for protecting the prerequisites of human dignity for the fewer, perhaps attributing to such prerequisites the symbolic status of human "rights". That can even work, as long as the fewer believe their vital interests sufficiently protected to yield with grace to the verdict of the ballot box.
That confidence is one of the fundamental assumptions of faith and practice of democracy in mature democratic societies. Here democracy means a way of life based on the assumption that individual freedom, mutual respect and fundamental good will toward the other-or, in the shorthand of the French revolution, Liberté, égalité, fraternité-can be taken for granted. Assuming that, we can speak not only of the mechanics of government but even of individual attitudes as democratic, as Tomáš Masaryk and John Dewey both do.
6 A person can be said to act democratically if his actions exhibit a respect for the integrity of others, a willingness to submit, while dissenting, to the decisions of the majority and, most of all, to approach questions of social coexistence with a good will to find commonly acceptable solutions. By contrast, approaching such questions as power conflicts whose purpose is to defeat and destroy the other, though it be done within the strict rules of parliamentary procedures, can be described as fundamentally undemocratic. In this broadly cultural sense, democracy is an outgrowth of a deeply rooted consensus on the posture of respect and good will toward all the starting point of all common dealing.
Certainly, democracy has objective presuppositions as well. A rule of the demos presupposes that a significant part of the population at large is a part of the polis, the active participants in the life of the community. Only in a metaphoric sense can we speak of democracy in a society in which eighty percent or more of the population are reduced to the status of mute drudges, as in France before the revolution or in Habsburg Austria until 1848. The ultimate democratic ideal assumes the demos to be coextensive with the polis.
Still, even with a wide enfranchisement of the demos the difference between a mob rule and democracy is one of basic posture toward the other. 7 If that posture is one of contempt and distrust, if prevailing motivation is greed rather than generosity or at least solidarity, the kind of social coexistence which writers like Dewey or Masaryk considered democratic becomes in principle impossible. A willingness to cooperate with the other, to join the other in a quest for an acceptable solution as well as the willingness to entrust oneself to the rule of the other, so notably absent in political discussion in the United States and in the Czech Republic alike, requires a great deal of trust that the other will not take advantage of good will, that mutually acceptable compromises are possible and that the task of governance is a quest of seeking in good will the common, long range good, not one of serving individual short term advantage. Democracy, we might say with some license, is a wager that John Locke and not Thomas Hobbes was right, or, less cryptically, that the metatheoretical assumptions of John Locke provide a better frame for our understanding, feeling and choosing than those of Thomas Hobbes.
That is the fundamental posture or paradigm within which democracy can appear a feasible and a desirable way of ordering human affairs. Originally, it was Christianity which articulated that assumption with its image of a harmonious world whose ordering supports harmonious modes of acting. In this vision, not chaos but fundamentally a benevolent order is primordial. Chaos enters the world only secondarily, in the course of history. Its entry can be symbolised by a particular act or event, as in the case of the Christian myth of the fall. It can be attributed to a particular development, as in the Marxist myth of the invention of private property. Or it can be attributed to an alienation of humans from Nature, as in the Romantic myth revived by some ecologists. 8 No matter. The constant is the conviction that discord is an intruder within a basically benign cosmic order favouring life in harmony.
That conviction is perhaps the fundamental tenet of European-and today EuroAmerican-civilisation. Augustine of Hippo articulated it in his fusion of a Hebraic vision of a benign Creator and the Stoic faith in the all-structuring order of Reason. Mediaeval scholastics may not have always understood that heritage, but they transmitted it to the age of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. In central Europe, Johann Gottfried Herder 9 may have been its most influential proponent. Herder was convinced that humans are neither evil nor fallen. At creation or at birth they are simply undeveloped, only a token and a promise of humanity. Full humanity for Herder means the ability to live together in freedom, respect and good will. As all things living, humans have a life long task of realising their full human potential, guided by reason and noble sentiment. The goal of that nurturing growth-education-is the ability to transcend primitive selfishness and brute force, rising to live in freedom, mutual respect and generous good will. For the women and men of the Enlightenment in Central Europe, that was simply the way things were. No wonder that democracy appeared to them as the fulfilment of highest human potential.
There have always been dissenters as well, sceptics who doubted that the European way of enframing experience as a benign cosmos is adequate to the way things are. The author of the book of Ecclesiastes may have been their forerunner. The Greek atomists and the kynikos, "dog philosophers" who gave us our word cynic, may have been that, too. Dissenters from mediaeval orthodoxy, lumped under the label of heretics, for the most part were not, seeking to restore the faith rather than challenge it. However, after faith bled to death on the battlefields of our wars of religion [sic] , thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche or his spiritual descendants, writers like Ernst Jünger or-fleetingly-Jan Patočka 10 came to the conclusion that the paradigm of the harmonious universe does not adequately interpret the cosmos or the world of humans. Hence the conclusion which seems to command a ready assent in our time: democracy is lovely for the benign periods of human history but breaks down inevitably in apocalyptic times. Is it, though, the way things are which makes an age apocalyptic? Certainly, the times which humans experienced as apocalyptic-such as the disintegration of Roman civilisation, the breakdown of the mediaeval synthesis or the onset of modernity-do share a common trait. They were all times of rapid social and demographic change which rendered traditional skills and assumptions as obsolete as Gabelsberger shorthand in an age of computers and left humans feeling inadequate and overwhelmed. Yet there were also periods of rapid change which humans experienced as times of opportunity and growth, such as the age of Reformation or that of Progress. Perhaps the question is really metatheoretical, not about the nature of an age but about ways of enframing it. Perhaps we need to enquire not only into the way things were but also into the ways humans experienced what they then described as an apocalyptic age.
Here I should suggest as a clue the title of a long ago film directed by Zdeněk Brynych, titled …and the Fifth Horseman is Fear.
11 It is not the classic four horsemen of the apocalypse that make an age apocalyptic, fearsome as they are. Humans have repeatedly found the courage to confront them. Only a fifth horseman, ominous, dark and nameless, can sap courage and render an age apocalyptic, …and the fifth horseman is fear.
The classic study of apocalyptic fear may still be Paul Tillich's book of half a century ago, The Courage to Be (1952) .
12 Tillich focuses on the panicking, paralysing dread which takes one's breath away and shakes the ground under one's feet, but has no definite object and remains unacknowledged. We go through our days as if nothing were happening while penetrated with a deadly dread which Tillich called anxiety. It is that fear-unto-death which defines epochs as apocalyptic as it seeks symbols to define itself-or, continuing our metaphor, as it seeks masks that would give identity to the ominous, faceless fifth horseman.
1968 in the sixth of the Heretical Essays in Philosophy of History as dissenter. See Kohák, E. (2008, 165-193) , and Patočka, J. "Wars of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War" in Kohák, E. (1989) . 11 …and the fifth horseman is fear, directed by Zdeněk Brynych, filmed in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia in 1964, was the last film to feature Karel Čapek's great love, Olga Scheinpflugová, and the first film of the Czechoslovak new wave in the 1960s. It was soon swept aside by more viewerfriendly films like the musical The Hop Pickers or Miloš Forman's Firemen's Ball. Viewer-friendly, it is a powerful study of ways in which fear distorts the behaviour of the wholly ordinary war-time occupants of a Prague apartment house in which a wounded resistance fighter is hiding-and the Gestapo knows it. 12 The author, a major German-American theologian, served as a German Army chaplain during WWI. His book, written in the aftermath of WWII, deals with the experience of a radically shaken faith and America's powerfully affected post-war generation. By the time it could be published in Czech in 2004, a new generation had arisen, shaped by the gospel of prosperity preached by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Not surprisingly, they found Karl Barth, a theologian of unshaken church dogmatism, far more congenial.
In antiquity, the break-down of the great Stoic synthesis occasioned such an age as confidence in the rational order of the cosmos collapsed together with the Roman Empire. At that time of loss of courage the fifth horseman took on the mask of anxiety of death and finitude. Once death no longer had a firm place in the cosmic order, because there no longer was an order, it became terrifying. The age became obsessed with the inescapability of finitude whose ultimate expression was death.
Religions responded with an assurance of the immortality of the soul, though that fell short of the need. The sting of death is the end of this life. Memories lingering into eternity hardly answered it. Christianity ultimately prevailed by holding out the hope of bodily resurrection, with its believers effectively cancelling the anxiety of finitude. Finitude is rule in time, but humans stand out of time into the timelessness of eternity, countering the threat of finitude in token and in promise. Though the collapse of Roman civilisation ushered in an age of hardship, it was no longer an apocalyptic age. As the Stoic synthesis had been one of Reason, the Logos, the great mediaeval synthesis was a synthesis of eternity.
That synthesis served Europe well, surviving even the Aristotelean challenge by introducing a two-tier conception of reality. However, in its success it bore the seed of its own destruction. Once death is no longer a threat, neither is it an escape. The idea of life overlapping into eternity inevitably implies that all our guilt, all our painful memories would cling to us for eternity as we stood condemned before an all knowing judge. That recognition brought on a very different anxiety, one of guilt and condemnation, vividly portrayed as an eternity of most fiendish torture. The mediaevals were good at that.
The Church fostered that dread while reassuring the faithful that its sacraments could effectively preserve them from such a fate. However, as the Renaissance raised expectations, our lords religious and secular grew ever more demanding, corrupt and oppressive, planting a seed of doubt. Can sacraments administered by a church so unworthy even in terms of its own teachings protect the faithful from eternal damnation? The dread of guilt and condemnation defined a new apocalyptic age.
The reformation led Europe out of this apocalyptic age with its faith in God's unmerited grace which cancels all sin and saves the believer from condemnation. At the same time, the Enlightenment responded to the dread with a trivialization of guilt as something humans can outgrow with nurture. The result was the synthesis of modernity, fusing divine grace and human rationality. The former rendered our lords religious obsolete, the latter our lords secular. With the obsolescence of the elites the time of the common man had come. Democracy was born, blithely confident that demos can live in peace, respect and good will without the supervision of an elite, religious or secular. Once more, apocalypse receded together with the dread.
Though also once more, the synthesis of modernity bore the seeds of new dread within it. If eternity takes death out of play while grace and reason do the same for guilt, what is there still to strive for? Yes, the triumphs of the Enlightenment were real enough. In the eighteenth century, European cities for the first time ceased to reek of putrefaction and became demographically positive, torture ceased to be an acceptable means of interrogation and legal systems began to toy with the possibility that even peasants might be human. Yet even as modernity prepared to celebrate, the Fifth Horsemen rode abroad once more, this time wearing the mask of meaninglessness. Humans, whose freedom charges them with the responsibility for choosing, need a sense of orientation. A world and a life devoid of meaning overwhelm them and the dread constitutes another apocalyptic age. Tillich describes the age that followed Nietzsche's pronouncement that God is dead as one of the anxiety of meaninglessness.
It might be more accurate to describe it as a century of a desperate quest for meaning.
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For the Europeans-in the broad sense of people of European cultural heritage-did not celebrate the loss of meaning as liberation, or at least not all of them or for long. They sought earnestly to fill the vacuum with new ideals. Nor did they turn to what was most destructive in their cultural heritage. In their quest for meaning they turned to what was noblest and brightest. They turned to the love of their land, their language and their cultural kinship. It was a noble and courageous acceptance of incarnation. In committing themselves to a particular cultural identity, humans are in effect accepting reality. Their life ceases to be a noncommittal possibility of being human in general. They become someone in particular, literally incarnate, and, as even God found out, that can be rather risky. It is at the same time an act of great courage-and of homecoming for the estranged.
However, as the ultimate meaning of life it is rather less than more. Under the pressure of an infinite demand, a finite impulse, however noble, grows rigid and defensive; understandably so. We all know how tense and irritable we become when charged with a task beyond our competence. Cast into the role of the ultimate meaning of life, even love of land and language took on the mien of rigid, defensive and aggressive nationalism. Instead of love and generosity, it came to generate fear and aggression. English speakers misappropriate the psychological term, paranoia, to describe; German describes it accurately as Abwehrpsychose, pathological obsession with danger and defence. In the 1930s, social democrats stood little chance against the seductive nationalist promise of pride and selfconfidence. Today, it is the stock in trade demagogues proclaiming Kulturkampf or clash of civilisations-and the justification of our omnipresent "security checks". In Germany, under the extreme conditions of the 1930s, it produced the ideology of Nazism. That won powerful allegiance by offering bewildered people a sense of meaning and of personal worth in the service of what one of his adherents, Martin Heidegger, called simply The Movement. It held their passionate loyalty until the bitter last battles around the Führerbunker. Amid the ruins, only a burnt-out ideology remained. Nationalism remains a perennial threat; it cannot be a hope.
A similar fate met the second noble impulse, the longing for social justice. Its roots are as old as the Old Testament prophets and the New Testament Sermon on the Mount. In the latter half of the 19 th century it became a faith and a hope as powerful as the lost religious faith of the Middle Ages. On the social democratic reading, it could offer a useful signpost along our pilgrimage through history. That, though, fell far short of the longing for meaning to replace the lost faith. When the Communists sought to make the quest for social justice into an ultimate ideology, committed to building-and freezing-a perfect society, socialism became rigid and defensive in its turn. First it expelled dissenters, and then it took to killing them. The Stalinist version of Communism left another burnt-out ideology in its wake. Very finite, very human ideology breaks down when saddled with an infinite task.
Religious believers have seized upon this analysis. Yes, the task of giving meaning to life and to all of creation is an infinite one, beyond the capacity of mortals. When humans turned away from God-presumably in the Enlightenment turn to reason or in the democratic conception of a secular state-their hopes collapsed under the weight of an infinite demand. True believers across denominations proclaim that God alone can give life meaning, adding sotto voce that they are God's true spokesmen. Only the Infinite can meet an infinite need.
It is a seductive call, in part because in a profound and rather vacuous sense it is true. Only an infinite vision can satisfy an infinite demand. The flaw in the claim is that as God had to become incarnate to enter the world, so an infinite vision must assume a very particular, finite form to be effective. The proposed response of great faith turned into a very finite belief, as burdened with vested interests and claims of power as nationalism or socialism. It first grew rigidly doctrinaire, shutting out doubt with claims of infallibility. When doubts persisted, it became repressive, producing first clericalism, then clerical fascism.
14 Generalissimo Franco's Spain offers a text-book example, though there were many others, in Portugal, in Slovakia, in Latin America down to the Chile of General Pinochette. Even today there are Protestant fundamentalists willing to shoot dissenters in cold blood, Jewish ultraorthodox Jews preaching and practising virulent racist supremacy or Muslim Islamists, pressing for authoritarian rule in the name of Allah.
15 Personal faith may sustain personal life, but it fails when it becomes an ideological justification for power. By mid-twentieth century, the world of European heritage resembled a wasteland of burntout ideologies and disillusioned humans. Hardly, it would seem, a favourable setting for democracy.
Yet it was the fifty years after the end of the Second World War that saw the greatest flourishing of European democracy, with grand achievements such as the social state and the European Union, addressing both the age old social and national question. Ironically, it was the urgent need to repair the devastation wrought by thirty years of wars of ideology that provided the framework for an age which sought itself beyond ideology. 16 It is time to forget 14 Fascism is not a synonym for Nazism or a name for any thoroughly nasty regime. Nazism-fanatic nationalism-was a revolutionary movement of the angry dispossessed, intent on destroying the old order which excluded them and creating a wholly new one as an expression of national passion. Fascism was a thoroughly conservative movement of threatened elites, seeking to preserve their position by enshrining unspecified traditional values and precluding all change. Thus it readily identified with the no less conservative and no less threatened ecclesiastical elites. See Kohák, E. (2008, 145-148) . 15 This is why I think it crucial to distinguish between faith in the sense of a personal bond to the holy and its expression in wonder, gratitude and generosity, and a religious ideology. It is equally important to distinguish churches as communities of believers and The Church as a worldly structure which claims divine mandate for secular demands. See Kohák, E. Výzvy věku a odvaha k pravdě (The Challenges of the Age and the Courage to Truth), in Ruml (in press). 16 Daniel Bell (1960) is a secular counterpart of Tillich's analysis in The Courage to Be. The author, a prolific writer, went on to offer an alternative vision a life-time later in Communitarianism and its Critics (1993) . In The End of Ideology, however, he did not anticipate the environmental threat.
about ideals and set about raising our level of material consumption, renamed as "standard of living." By the 1950s, a new great faith had risen-that increasing affluence will resolve all social and personal problems as a side effect. 17 Life seemed once more to have a purposeincreasing consumption. Not ideals or ideologies, but the Invisible Hand (a.k.a. economic determinism) came to guarantee the benign world in which democracy could thrive.
And thrive it did, at least where brute force did not pre-empt it, in a new age of historic optimism. While on the fringes America continued to fight its ideological wars of democratic capitalism [sic] , Europe thought itself the isle of the blessed-and Austria called itself that explicitly-glorying in a sophisticated version of primitive accumulation, all the while waiting for the bubble to burst. By the time that countries on the far side of the barbed wire fences could hope for a place among the blessed-by the mid-1980s-it was becoming clear that something is seriously amiss. Mindless deregulation and tax cuts corroded the very infrastructure of democracy. The Invisible Hand was clearly failing to deliver either peace or prosperity. Most conspicuously, social injustice inevitably leads to massive arming to gain or protect the accumulated wealth. Left without a guiding ideal, material growth failed to provide either global justice or global peace.
The recognition of limits of growth proved the final blow. The last, most persistent article of faith of the years of democracy-without-ideology was its commitment to an open-ended growth of Growth, an exponential expansion of consumption. It was a tenet as old as John Locke's vision of the bounty of nature-and as the imperial vision of ever new frontiers to conquer. Our strategy of denial may also stem from the need to deny the evident-that infinite expansion of a finite world must necessarily fail. A first warning was the plaintive cry of poets over the plight of nature, 18 dismissed by tough-minded rhetors as an idle fancy of the tender-minded. Then came the calculations of diminishing sources of energy, dismissed with the promise of new technologies.
19 Then reality poked through denial in the form of climactic change. 20 The earth is really finite, only our civilisation is infinitely vulnerable. It is within human power to destroy the presuppositions of civilization. After our bubble of historic optimism in the post-war half century, we have reached the end of the road. The Fifth Horseman is once more abroad, heralding a new age of fear. In an age based on denial, it is the fear of what in our heart of hearts we know to be truth. The way we are living is unsustainable, but we lack the will to change. This time, it is truly an apocalyptic age.
With that, we have gone a full circle and need to face our opening question: can democracy find a strategy for coping with the new apocalyptic age? Hitherto the results of our enquiry have been rather less than promising. The pace of change is far too rapid for any generation to gain confidence in its ways of coping. The skills and strategies of our fathers become obsolete in the age of their sons. The world appears ominous, we ourselves overwhelmed and threatened, tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine. Yet democracy, with its Enlightenment heritage of sober rationality, seems ill-equipped for dealing with apocalyptic threats.
For once we cover finite threats with blanket denial, the demands that stand out are truly infinite. Already Karl Marx identified one global threat, that of social injustice, and an infinite demand, to build a kingdom of God on earth, a perfect society in an imperfect world. He predicted an apocalypse, but his world was still rational enough that he could expect that apocalypse to be a new creation. The Armageddon of the proletarian revolution will produce a just new order. That hope burned out, but the longing for social justice is infinite and the reality of the world terrifying. As Marx foretold, the rich get richer as the poor get poorer, but we can no longer hope that History will assure a happy issue out of our afflictions. The reality we have denied threatens an apocalypse.
Another Karl, this time Jaspers 21 was one of the many who identified a second global threat and a second infinite demand-the threat of violence raised to infinite power by nuclear capabilities and the infinite demand for a world without violence. The nuclear threat remains, but violence has taken a far more ominous form of the world saturated with weaponry until school children kill their classmates. Yet we deny reality and continue to think of weaponry as a way to safety. We seem to have lost our ability to trust. Yet democracy cannot survive without trust. When we refuse to admit the interconnection between fear, weapons and violence, the escalating level of personal and global violence grows apocalyptic.
The third global threat, environmental degradation, has no single spokesperson, 22 yet it is the most ominous because neither does it have a clear villain. Growth has become integrally a part of freedom and democracy. Yet all great civilisations ultimately perished of social injustice fuelling violence and producing environmental degradation which destroyed their economic base. We are constantly reminded by reports of governments and foundations alike as well as by the changes in our climate, yet we persistently repress the thought. It is perhaps the most blatant instance of our denial. To admit the threat has causes would require us to act. Denial is a far more comfortable strategy. Yet when we detach the threat from discrete causes, it becomes apocalyptic.
We cannot quite deny the threat itself, and so we crowd our minds with images of doom which call for no action. Perhaps the most common is the vision of extraterrestrial 21 Karl Jaspers was the first philosopher to recognise that nuclear technology gives humans the capacity for global self-destruction in his The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man (1961) . The Czech humanist philosopher Milan Machovec, follower of Masaryk, in his Filosofie tváří v tvář zániku (Philosophy Confronting the Doom) (1998) recognises that the doom is not a matter of external threat but that of the dynamics of our civilisation. 22 Actually, it does not need one. All scientific institutions and all governments-the European Union, Russia, China, India, latterly even the United States and Australia-recognise the threat and the need for someone to do something about it, but someone else. I have offered a survey of individual voices in environmental ethics in my The Green Halo (1999, 105-154). invaders who are invariably hostile and armed with apocalyptic weaponry. Alternately, it is the vision of a global terrorist conspiracy of humans motivated solely by a virulent hate of our prosperity or, unbelievably, of our democracy, rather like the mythical "anarchists" of a century and more ago. We conjure up visions of an Islamic threat-this time in analogy with the yellow peril of 19 th century fame-which has very little in common either with Islam and its theology or with the Moslem world with its hopes and problems. The list is as endless as our need to repress a reality we cannot quite deny but dare not face. The dread of our apocalyptic age is the dread of the truth denied at the foundation of our civilisation.
That, I believe, is the crucial recognition-that what makes our age apocalyptic is truth denied. When we refuse to recognise finite reasons for fear, all that remains is an indefinite dread to which no response is possible. Were we in fact charged with the task of saving the world or giving meaning to our lives, the task would be infinite and our paralysing dread justified. A democratic social strategy for an apocalyptic age need begin by disarming apocalyptic dread.
The path to that leads not through building ever more powerful arsenals but rather the opposite-through the recognition that we are not and cannot be omnipotent. We have pronounced God dead, and within our comprehension, that may be so. That, though, does not mean that we have inherited the power or the responsibility which God once exercised and bore. Perhaps History, perhaps Nature, perhaps Contingency have taken God's place. Only we certainly have not. It is not our responsibility and it is not within our power to save the world or bestow meaning upon it and upon our lives.
We have our finite tasks within our power. We may not be able to create a world of social justice on the model of the biblical Kingdom of God, or even on the level of erstwhile Soviet real Communism or of gleaming American alabaster cities undimmed by human tear. We can, however, cope with social injustice in its concrete, flagrant forms. We can use taxation to prevent social polarisation. We can explore social resources for dealing with problems created by private greed and blindness. We can strive to assure that none are left uncared for in illness, misfortune or old age. No, it will not create an ideal world, but it can save so much needless suffering! The same is true of the threat of violence. No, we cannot create a world without conflict. A world in which there is wiggle room will never be a world of perfect harmony, running with the smoothness of the Swiss railway system. But we can do so much to prevent needless violence! We can curtail the monstrous trade in armaments. We can refuse to support arrogance of power and support instead the integrity of its victims. We can create instruments and habits of arbitration. Once we give up our arrogant claim to ultimate authority which leaves us feeling impotent before the infinity of the task, we can recognise so many finite tasks urgent and within our power.
It is likewise with environmental degradation. If we take our task to be one of saving civilisation, we might well despair before its immensity. But there is so much we can do! We can radically reduce our demand, learning to distinguish between need and want. We can learn to appreciate values which are as sustainable as love and joy instead of escalating our demands on the earth. And yes, we can sign and enforce global legislation to protect the environment and limit the damage we cause. The arrogant posture of omnipotence leads to paralysis. A democratic strategy needs to be one that has the courage to face the truth and the commitment to deal heart and will with the finite tasks we recognise once we give up the arrogance of infinite ones.
Can a democratic strategy of truth, courage and effort aimed at partial tasks prevent an apocalypse? Perhaps it can, though actually I rather doubt it. All I know is that a strategy of global visions can surely bring it on. Civilisations have arisen and have perished before, for all too familiar reasons. There are ample reasons to suppose it is our turn and that in two hundred years Europe will look rather like it did two hundred years after the fall of Rome. Only the prospect is no longer a source of paralysing dread. Actually, when we give up the arrogance of omnipotence, it becomes rather irrelevant. We have our tasks: To feed the poor-and deal with the causes of poverty; to limit the arms trade-and invest in non-violent ways of resolving conflicts; to prevent yet another concrete monstrosity on the precious green spaces of Prague 11-and to find and foster sustainable values and postures of human communion with each other and with the Earth. It just might work out. The grasp for the absolute will not.
The fate of our civilisation is not in our hands. That, though, ceases to be a paralysing apocalyptic outlook once we find the courage and humility to recognise that salvation of the world or our personal salvation is not in our hands. Whose hands? Perhaps in the hands of Fortune; or Nature; or History; or God; or perhaps it is a matter of seeing our life in time as Masaryk counselled, from the perspective of Eternity. Here, to be sure, we enter the realm of metaphors. But then, as Erwin Schrödinger recognised in the thought if not in the word, the membrane between metatheory and metaphor is infinitely permeable. 
